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Abstract 
 
A review of system resilience ideas found in literature and standards is conducted. Attention is particularly focused in the 
built-infrastructure, where both natural and man-made hazards are considered. In order to highlight the fragility of critical 
infrastructures and communities to hazards and the serious consequences of disruptions and failures, some examples of 
major disasters are presented. Various definitions for resilience are included and discussed in order to provide the 
necessary, basic concepts and background. An attempt is made to introduce some resilience properties and metrics in 
terms of functionality, recovery time etc. The interrelation of structural resilience and fragility curves is put into evidence 
and the need of some form of Guidelines along with the required research are indicated.  
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Hazards pose continuing and significant threats to building and infrastructure sys-
tems. Hazards type and magnitude vary by location, making resilience of buildings
and infrastructures, also referred to as built environment, a national or suprana-
tional issue. In fact, considering the European Union, which developed political
and technological infrastructure links between countries, a failure in one critical
infrastructure can heavily impact many countries, especially where the infrastruc-
ture is a cross-border link or a feeds one (Lewis et al., 2013).
Despite substantial progress in science and technology towards improved per-
formance of the built environment, natural and man-made hazards are responsible
for loss of life, disruption of commerce and financial networks, damage property,
and loss of business continuity and essential services. The risk across European
Union for damage due to hazard events continue to increase and many physical
infrastructures are susceptible to natural hazards (e.g. along coastlines and in
earthquake-prone regions) and man-made hazards. Moreover, many infrastruc-
tures are vulnerable due to aging effects resulting in a diminishing capacity to
resist disaster scenarios. In fact, even if European Union is a highly developed
modern society (three of the world’s ten busiest passenger airport (A.C.I., 2013),
the world’s largest financial center (Z/Yen-Group, 2011) and a higher number of
mobile phones than people are present in the EU) it is also part of the “Old World”,
its infrastructures are the result of a long history and many of them were built
before the EU was created (Lewis et al., 2013).
Source:www.attivissimo.net
Figure 1: A representation of how Italy would have appeared from space on the night
of the blackout of September 2003
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In order to highlight the fragility of European communities and World with
respect to critical infrastructures failure and hazards some examples are provided.
Italian electrical black out of September 2003 (Bacher et al., 2003) is a key incident
that must be considered. The blackout was initiated when two power lines in
Switzerland flashed over in an alpine storm, causing the Italian grid to increase
demand from, and overload other lines that brought power to France, and then
causing blackouts across the entire Italian grid and failures in Switzerland (Figure
1). This is not the only example concerning electrical grid, in fact in 2006 an outage
occurred when a power line crossing the River Ems in Germany was switched off to
allow a cruise ship to pass (Figure 2), causing an unintentionally trigger blackouts
that spread to France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Power system elements were
also tripped in Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia, Ukraine, Romania and Marocco
(UCTE, 2007).
Source:http://news.nationalgeographic.com
Figure 2: Norwegian Pearl ship in the Papenburg, Germany, shipyard in November
2006. The ship indirectly caused a two-hour power outage on the evening of November
4, 2006
Tunnels represent another example of important infrastructure links. Many
important road and rail tunnels are the main cross border routes in Europe. Tun-
nels are vulnerable to explosion and fire. Examples include the Mont Blanc and
Tauern Tunnel fires (UN (2001), Figures 3 and 4 and the Channel Tunnel fires of
1996 (Figure 5), 2006 and 2008 (CTSA, 1997; RAIB, 2007; BEA-TT and RAIB,
2010).
When a protection of critical infrastructures is considered, terrorism remains
a major worry. Europol (2012) recorded 316 attacks in the EU in 2009, 249 in
2010 and 174 in 2011 and an increase use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
by terrorists of various affiliations. The components required for the construc-
tion of IEDs are easy to procure, their production requires expertise that can be
obtained through open source information, and the chemical precursors can be
6
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Source:http://www.tunneltalk.com
Figure 3: Aftermath of the fierce fire that claimed 39 lives in the Mont Blanc tunnel.
Source:http://www.landroverclub.net
Figure 4: The Tauern Tunnel fire. The main site in the rear burned at over 1000℃.
A thick coat of foam covers the ground and parts of the roof hanging down against the
fiery background.
legally obtained in EU Member States. Improvised devices like incendiary de-
vices (IIDs) were used in a coordinated action to target railway infrastructures in
Germany in October 2011. Railway infrastructures and their occupants were the
target of terroristic attacks in London and Madrid. Three days before the Spain’s
election, during the peak of Madrid morning rush hour of Thursday, 11 March
2004, ten explosions occurred aboard four commuter trains (Figure 6(a)). All the
target trains were traveling between Alcalá de Henares and the Atocha station in
Madrid in the same direction, three bombs exploded in the Atocha station, two
bombs exploded in different carriages in the El Pozo del Tío Raimundo Station,
7
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Source:http://www.tunneltalk.com
Figure 5: Damage caused by the 1996 freight shuttle train fire in the Channel Tunnel.
(a) (b)
Source (a):http://www.telegraph.co.uk Source (b):http://www.dailymail.co.uk
Figure 6: Terroristic attacks in rail transport system in Europe: a) Madrid, 2004; b)
London, 2005.
one explosion occurred in the Santa Eugenia Station and the last one exploded in
different coaches of the train approximately 800 meters from Atocha Station. The
explosions killed 191 people and wounded 1.800. One year after Madrid’s attacks,
on 7 July 2005, a series of coordinated suicide attacks in central London were
conducted by four terrorists, they targeted civilians using the public transport
system during the morning rush hour (Figure 6(b)). Two attacks were conducted
on two Circle line sub-surface train, while the third one targeted a Piccadilly line
deep-level underground train traveling southbound from King’s Cross-St. Pancras
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(a) (b)
Source:http://en.wikipedia.org
Figure 7: Composite map of the volcanic ash cloud spanning in 14-25 April 2010 for
the Eyjafjallajökull eruption.
Source:http://www.tboeckel.de
Figure 8: Aerial image from Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption. Ash cloud on May 12,
2010.
and Russell Square and it damaged also the surrounding tunnel. Finally one hour
after the first attack a bomb was detonated on the top deck of a double-decker
bus. Naturally these events caused serious disruptions in the rail transport system
of the two cities, and it took several days for a full recovery.
Although Europe is imagined to be relatively free of severe natural hazards,
significant risks are present and can potentially be extreme due to the high den-
sity of population in the region. EEA (2003) recorded the highest loss of life from
natural events in the period 1998–2009 to be from heat waves while floods and
storms caused the greatest economic loss. Those are not the only examples of
natural hazards, in April 2010 the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Ice-
9
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(a) (b)
Source (a):http://earthsky.org Image credit: NASA Source (b):https://www.tcpalm.com
Figure 9: Hurricane Andrew: a) three views of Andrew on 23, 24 and 25 August 1992
as the hurricane moves from East to West; b) the Florida City water tower is almost all
that remains standing in August 1992 after the coastal community was hit by Hurricane
Andrew.
(a) (b)
Source (a):http://libertesedosistema.blogspot.it Source (b):http://en.wikipedia.org
Figure 10: The World Trade Center attack: a) 9th September 2001, Flight 175 crashes
into 2 WTC; b) the remains of 6 World Trade Center, 7 World Trade Center, and 1
World Trade Center on September 17, 2001.
land compromised the European air traffic for weeks showing how an unexpected
phenomenon can influence critical infrastructures, even if they are not directly hit
(Figure 7 and 8).
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(a) (b)
Source (a):http://www.satimagingcorp.com Source (b):http://de.wikipedia.org
Figure 11: Hurricane Katrina: a) satellite image of the hurricane; b) flooding caused
by Hurricane Katrina in the New Orleans area, August 31st, 2005.
Obviously, Europe is subjected to and is prone to hazards like many other
countries such as the United States, where in particular three disaster events sig-
nificantly influenced the development of resilience concepts. Hurricane Andrew in
1992, the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon terroristic attacks in 2001,
and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (McAllister, 2013). Andrew struck Dade County
on August 24th, the storm devastated Dade County and it caused an estimated 25
billion of dollar in damage and it destroyed approximately 49 000 homes (Figure
9). On September 11, 2001, large aircrafts were flown into the World Trade Center
buildings and Pentagon by terrorists. The fires following the impact caused WTC
1 and WTC 2 buildings to collapse within approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. When
the buildings collapse the fire spread to the WTC 7 building where the emergency
Operations Centre was located (Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003), Figure 10). The
collapse of WTC buildings led to major damage to surrounding buildings and loss
of power, communication and water in lower Manhattan as well as interruption of
financial markets. The loss of life by occupants and responders, and the damage
of the surrounding buildings and infrastructure systems, raised the issue about
how building collapse can affect the entire built community (NIST, 2008). Hurri-
cane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region and rapidly reached Category 5 with
maximum sustained winds of 78 m/s. Storm surge and associated wave action
led to breaches in the flood protection system in New Orleans, resulting in sub-
stantial structural damage to residences in the immediate vicinity of breaches and
flooding in approximately 75% of the city (Figure 11). Bridges were damaged due
to the uplift and lateral loads imparted by storm surge and associated wave ac-
tion. Moreover, industrial facilities, such as seaports, petrochemical facilities and
utilities also sustained damage due to storm surge and flooding (NIST, 2006).
The extensive, multi-state damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 reminded
that natural disasters continue to be a significant threat to our communities. The
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unprecedented level of destruction brought renewed focus on the need to address
natural disasters, in addition to protection from man-made hazards. Tragic events,
previously described, forced the scientific community to investigate the concept of
resilience and to move their attention from vulnerability and risk assessment to
a new design and evaluation approaches that have to consider and involve many
different disciplines: economics, political science, engineering, environmental plan-
ning, social science, etc.. The evolution towards resilience thinking is far from
trivial, resilience as a concept is more dynamic, it is non-linear and cross-linked,
complex so to say and it embraces uncertainty (Stumpp, 2013). Current thinking
on resilience is the product of theoretical and practical constructs that have seen
refining and reshaping of the disaster paradigm over the past three decades. This
has led to a multiple of definitions and the need of new terminology and/or metrics
that should be harmonized. For this reason in the next section various definitions
are presented and discussed in order to give the basic knowledge needed to develop
further research in the field of critical infrastructure resilience.
2 Definition and terminology
Resilience is derived from Latin word resilio, meaning “to jump back” (Klein et al.,
2003). The resilience concept is applied in many fields and the original one is still
contested: some say ecology (Batabyal, 1998), while other researchers say physics
(Van der Leeuw and Leygonie, 2000). However, most of the literature states that
the study of resilience evolved from disciplines of psychology and psychiatry in
the 1940s (Waller, 2001; Johnson and Wiechelt, 2004). Today resilience is being
applied in many fields, especially disaster management.
The concept of resilience started to lead a new way to tackling disaster and
provide policy options. However in order to enhance resilience it is necessary to
have a good initial understanding of what it is, its determinant factors (Klein et al.,
1998) and how it can be measured, maintained and improved (Klein et al., 2003).
Table 1: Definitions of resilience (Manyena, 2006)
Author Definition
Wildavsky (1988) Resilience is the capacity to cope with
unanticipated dangers after they have be-
come manifest, learning to bounce back.
Hoiling et al. (1997) It is the buffer capacity or the ability to a
system to absorb perturbation, or magni-
tude of disturbance that can be absorbed
before a system changes its structure by
changing the variables.
Table 1: continues on next page
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Table 1: continued from previous page
Author Definition
Horne and Orr (1997) Resilience is a fundamental quality of in-
dividuals, group and organisations, and
systems as a whole to respond produc-
tively to significant change that disrupts
the expected pattern of events without
engaging in an extended period of regres-
sive behaviour.
Mallak (1998) Resilience is the ability of an individ-
ual or organisation to expeditiously de-
sign and implement positive adaptive be-
haviours matched to the immediate situ-
ation, while enduring minimal stress.
Mileti (1999) Local resiliency with regard to disasters
means that a locale is able to withstand
an extreme natural event without suffer-
ing devastating losses, damage, dimin-
ished productivity, or quality of life with-
out a large amount of assistance from
outside the community.
Comfort (1999) The capacity to adapt existing resources
and skills to new systems and operating
conditions.
Paton et al. (2000) Resilience describes an active process of
self-righting, learned resourcefulness and
growth the ability to function psycho-
logically at a level far greater than ex-
pected given the individual’s capabilities
and previous experiences.
Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) The ability to respond to unique and sin-
gular events.
Cardona (2003) The capacity of the damaged ecosystem
or community to absorb negative impacts
and recover from these.
Pelling (2003) The ability of an actor to cope with or
adapt to hazard stress.
Table 1: continues on next page
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Table 1: continued from previous page
Author Definition
UNISDR (2005) The capacity of a system, community or
society potentially exposed to hazards to
adapt, by resisting or changing in order
to reach and maintain an acceptable level
of functioning and structure. This is de-
termined by the degree to which the so-
cial system is capable of organising itself
to increase this capacity for learning from
past disaster for better future protection
and to improve risk reduction measures.
Table 1: concluded from previous page
Different authors have proposed diverse definitions, reflecting the complexity of
matter, society and thinking on disaster and building resilience. In Table 1 some
of the definitions are listed. What can be pointed out is how the resilience has
been defined in two ways: as a desired outcome or as a process leading to a desired
outcome (Kaplan, 2002). Focusing the attention on Table 1, a gradual refinement
in the resilience definition can be highlighted: from a more outcome-oriented to
more process-oriented. In the early stage authors were thinking of resilience as
a process to reach an outcome and the use of words like “cope”, “bounce back”,
“absorb negative impacts” to return to normal in the shortest possible time might
be more appropiate for objects capable or regaining their original shape after a
deformation (Manyena, 2006). On the other hand, when people are considered,
resilience centres on quick recovery from shock, illness or hardship (Vickers and
Kouzmin, 2001). The goal of disaster resilience and more in general to disaster risk
management is to guarantee a minimal loss of life and livelihoods and allow the
affected system or environment to return to normal within the shortest possible
time. From this point of view it is important to underline that resilience is arguably
linked on people’s capacity far beyond the minimum of being able to cope.
On the basis of these first observations, it appears clear that merely a definition
of resilience on the basis of minimum standards of development and requirements
may be an inadequate conceptual and practical application of the approach. The
danger of viewing disaster resilience as an outcome is the tendency to reinforce the
traditional practice of disaster management, which takes a reactive stance, leading
to a propensity to follow a paternalistic mode that can lead to the skewing of
activities towards supply rather than demand as underlined by Manyena (2006).
Activities such as community capacity building, mitigation and emergency pre-
paredness planning, which impact greatly on response and recovery operations,
may be neglected (McEntire et al., 2002). Moreover, these observations can be
transferred in the engineering field when the concept of resilience is used for build-
ings, building communities and critical infrastructures.
14
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In the last years researchers, engineers and specialists have posed a lot of at-
tention in the concept of resilience, pushed by the catastrophic events previously
described and led reaction of societies and politicians (PPD, 2013; European Com-
mission, 2006); they are trying to not only define and clarify resilience concept
but also implement strategies to enhance it in the new and old building systems.
However, these strategies can not be limited to minimum prescription in stan-
dards and codes but should define new design procedures in requirements like for
disaster management, where many different social-economic aspects and complex
interactions are taken into account, as highlighted by McEntire et al. (2002).
3 Critical infrastructures and structures
Critical infrastructures is a term used to describe systems or assets that are essen-
tial for the functioning of a society and economy. In the common use of the word,
the term is associated to assets and facilities linked to:
• electricity generation, transmission and distribution;
• oil and oil products production, transport and distribution;
• gas production, transport and distribution;
• water supply (drinking water, waste water/sewage, stemming of surface wa-
ter (e.g. dikes and sluices));
• heating (e.g. natural gas, fuel oil, district heating);
• telecommunication and cyberspace;
• transportation systems (fuel supply, railway network, airports, harbours, in-
land shipping);
• financial services (banking, clearing);
• public health (hospitals, ambulances);
• security services (police, military).
The whole asset listed above represents key point for governments and institutions,
however some different classification and definitions can be considered by different
authorities. The United States defined critical infrastructure as those “systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the inca-
pacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.” (Public Law 107–56 (2001)). On the other hand,
the European Commission proposed a slightly different definition (European Com-
mission, 2006) due to its particular political nature: “European Critical Infrastruc-
tures constitute those designated critical infrastructures which are of the highest
15
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importance for the Community and which if disrupted or destroyed would affect
two or more Member State, or a single Member State if the critical infrastructure
is located in another Member State. This includes transboundary effects result-
ing from interdependencies between interconnected infrastructures across various
sectors.”
The threat from terrorism and man-made hazards are usually considered as
a priority for critical infrastructure, however protection of them should be based
on an all-hazards approach. Terrorism, other criminal activities, natural hazards
and other causes of accidents are not constrained by geographical national and
international borders. Threats cannot be seen in a purely regional context; this
means that the external dimension of a critical infrastructure need to be fully and
carefully taken into account, the interconnected and interdependent nature of the
today’s economy and society lead to increase tremendously the system complexity:
even a disruption outside of the national borders or EU’s border may have serious
impact on the community.
For the above-listed critical infrastructures, buildings and other types of civil engi-
neering structures form an important integral part and thus they play a significant
role in contributing to the community resilience. For the term “critical structure”
there is no specific definition in literature, however it is convenient to introduce
one for the document purposes. Critical structure could be defined as an element
and/or structure inside a critical infrastructure that is essential for the system
functionality or structures which if disrupted would decrease sensibly the func-
tionality. Moreover, it would be useful to extend this definition in order to include
some other building and structures that are disconnected from an infrastructural
system but have an important role for governments, like embassies, consulates,
etc.
3.1 A conceptual framework for resilience
Due to the extent of the catastrophic consequences that an earthquake can have,
seismic resilience of communities has received early attention by researchers, de-
signers, urban planners and administrators. For example, the Disaster Mitigation
Act of 2000 in the United States, which provides the legal basis for FEMA miti-
gation planning, has promoted mitigation, preparedness and the strengthening of
communities against disasters. Following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, Cal-
ifornia has taken further steps in this direction by enacting ordinance SB1953
(Meade and Kulick, 2007). This ordinance requires that acute care facilities must
be retrofitted by 2030 (with two intermediate milestones of 2008 and 2013) to the
level that would allow them to be fully operational following an earthquake.
3.1.1 Dimensions of Resilience
Working in the field of seismic mitigation, Bruneau et al. (2003) have suggested
that resilience can be conceptualized along four interrelated dimensions: techni-
cal, organizational, social and economic (referred under the acronym: TOSE).
16
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Technical resilience refers to the response and performance of the physical systems
when subjected to earthquake forces. Organizational resilience refers to the capac-
ity and ability of agencies/organizations to respond to emergencies and carry out
critical functions. Social resilience refers to the capacity to reduce the negative
societal consequences of loss of critical services in the aftermath of catastrophic
events. Economic resilience refers to the ability to reduce the direct and indi-
rect economic losses resulting from destructive earthquakes. As argued, of these
four dimensions, the technical and organizational dimensions are most pertinent
to the performance and resilience of critical systems such as electric power, water,
hospital and emergency response. The social and economic dimensions are most
relevant to the performance and resilience of the community as a whole.
3.1.2 Properties of Resilience
Bruneau et al. (2003) further suggest that resilience has four main properties:
robustness, rapidity, redundancy and resourcefulness (abbreviated as: 4
R’s). Robustness refers to the strength, or the ability of elements, systems and
other units of analysis to withstand a given level of stress or demand without
suffering degradation or loss of function. Rapidity can be thought as the capacity
to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely manner in order to contain losses
and avoid future disruption. Redundancy refers to the availability of substitutable
elements or systems that can be activated when earthquake-related disruptions
occur. Finally, resourcefulness is the capacity to mobilize and apply material
and human resources to achieve goals in the event of disruptions. Of these four
properties, it is useful to view robustness and rapidity as the desired ends of
resilience-enhancing measures, and redundancy and resourcefulness as some of the
means to these ends, respectively.
Regarding seismic resilience of communities, of the several factors that can
affect it, it appears logical to start by focusing on organizations and facilities,
whose function is essential for community well-being in the aftermath of earth-
quake disasters. These critical facilities include electrical power and water lifelines,
public health (acute-care hospitals), and services that have the responsibility for
emergency management at the local community level. Such organizations form
the “backbone” for community functioning. For these situations Bruneau et al.
(2003) propose a set of several illustrative measures of resilience, which relate to
the above four dimensions and four properties. Those measures referring to the
“global” system performance are reported in Table 2. However, as is stated, such
measures and performance matrices serve mainly to illustrate the definitions, and
through research these measures should be refined to be more consistent with the
notion of system and community resilience. Indeed, as resilience is a multidimen-
sional concept, developing measures of resilience that are quantifiable, succinct
and meaningful remains always the principal challenge. An attempt for such a
setting is presented in the following chapters.
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4 Resilience of critical structures and Metrics
Resilience concepts could be applied at different structural levels. The term re-
silience is commonly used for materials and the definitions presented in Section
2 can be applied for structural elements, structures and infrastructures. For the
finality of the present document only structures and built-infrastructure will be
considered, in particular this section is devoted to resilience applications on struc-
tures. Applying the definitions presented above in the structural field without any
modification or adaptation is a very difficult task. Some formal and quantitative
variables should be introduced in order to quantify the resilience of a critical struc-
ture. In this sense Bruneau and Reinhorn (2007) and subsequently Cimellaro et al.
(2010) have introduced a useful definition of resilience:
Resilience (R) is defined as a function indicating the capability to sustain a
level of functionality or performance for a given building, bridge, lifeline networks,
or community, over a period defined as the control time (TLC) that is usually de-
cided by owners, or society.
Hence, resilience is a function that can vary in time due to external events
like earthquake or explosion which can reduce it or because of actions focused on
performance improvement. Due to this time variability and the framework consid-
ered it is important to introduce a new variable called recovery time (Porter et al.,
2001; Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2007; Cimellaro et al., 2009, 2010):
The recovery time (TRE) is the period necessary to restore the functionality of a
structure, and infrastructure system to a desired level that can operate or function
the same, or close to, or better than the original one.
The time recovery is a random variable with high uncertainties depending on
the socio-economic environment where the critical structure is placed, a fact that
could play an important role in the construction recovery time and the business
interruption time; however, TRE should be smaller than TLC . The definitions pro-
posed by Bruneau and Reinhorn (2007), Cimellaro et al. (2010) were introduced in
an earthquake engineering framework using the Multidisciplinary Center of Earth-
quake Engineering to Extreme Event (MCEER) background and terminology. In
this context the seismic performance of the structure/system is measured through
a unique decision variable (DV) named “Resilience” that combines other variables
(economic losses, life losses, recovery time, etc.). All these concepts can be used
for a large number of different hazards implementing the necessary changes to the
various models and equations that will be presented later on.
On the basis of the previous discussion and definitions the Resilience can be com-
puted through the following equation (Cimellaro et al., 2010):
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R =
∫ t0E+TRE
t0E
Q(t)
TRE
dt (1)
The Resilience is defined graphically as the normalized area subtended by the
functionality function defined as Q(t). Q(t) is a non-stationary stochastic process
and can be expressed as follow:
Q(t) = 1− L(I, TRE) · [H(t− t0E)−H(t− (t0E + TRE))] · fRec(t, t0E, TRE) (2)
where L(I, TRE) is the loss function; fRec(t, t0E, TRE) is the recovery function; H()
is the Heaviside function, t0E is the time of the occurred event E and I is its
intensity. The values of the quantities in this equation are less than one, as the
desired full functionality is equal to 100% =1.
Desired
Functionality
TLC Time
Functionality
Q(t) (%)
100
50
0
t0E + TREt0E
Recovery
Function
Recovery Phase
L
Res
Figure 12: Schematic representation of resilience over the recovery time TRE (Cimellaro
et al., 2010)
In Equation 1 resilience is computed with reference to a single disrupting event
E at time t0E and the subtended area is normalized with respect to the recovery
time TRE, Figure 12. This normalization with respect to the recovery time TRE
should be considered if more emphasis has to be placed on the recovery phase. In
order to take into account the long term or time effects on resilience Equation 1
should be changed: the integral limits have to be extended from 0 to TLC and the
normalization time should be set equal to TLC , Figure 13. Civil structures and the
main activities inside or linked to them could have some functionality reduction
in the time due to age problem or degradation induced by external/environmental
agents, in some cases it could be interesting to evaluate the resilience of such kind
of structures (see Figure 14).
As highlighted in Section 2 defining resilience is challenging, but probably identi-
fying the aspects that can enhance resilience can be even more difficult. As men-
tioned above, Bruneau et al. (2003) have identified four properties along which
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Functionality
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t0E + TREt0E
Recovery
Function
Recovery Phase
L
Figure 13: Schematic representation of resilience over the control time TLC (Cimellaro
et al., 2010)
resilience can be improved: rapidity, robustness, redundancy and resourcefulness.
Rapidity (θ) is the “capacity to meet priorities and achieve goals in a timely
manner in order to contain losses and avoid future disruption”
Mathematically it represents the slope of the functionality curve during the
recovery period as illustrated in Figure 15 and it can be expressed by the following
equation:
θ =
dQ(t)
dt
(3)
where d/dt is the differential operator, Q(t) is the functionality function. An
average estimation of the rapidity can be defined as in Equation 4 when total
losses L and time recovery TRE are known:
θ =
L
TRE
(4)
Robustness is the “ability of elements, structure or system to withstand a given
level of stress, or demand without suffering disproportionate degradation or loss of
function”
It is therefore the residual functionality after an extreme event as described by
the following equation:
Robustness = 1 − L˜ (mL, σL) (5)
where L˜ is a random variable expressed as a function of the mean mL and the
standard deviation σL. A more direct way to compute robustness is to consider
the dispersion of losses expressed directly as follows:
Robustness = 1 − L˜ (mL + a · σL) (6)
21
4 CRITICAL STRUCTURES
Res
Desired
Functionality
TLC Time
Functionality
Q(t) (%)
100
50
0
t0E + TREt0E
Recovery
Function
Recovery Phase
Functionality
reduction
due to long
term effects
Figure 14: Schematic representation of resilience and the effects of long term agents
TLC Time
Functionality
Q(t) (%)
100
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Rapidity
θ = L/TRE
L
Figure 15: Schematic representation of rapidity concept (Cimellaro et al., 2010)
where a is a weight parameter of the standard deviation corresponding to a spe-
cific level of losses; in this definition robustness can be considered also the capacity
of keeping the variability of losses within a narrow band (Figure 16). A way to
decrease uncertainty in robustness is to reduce the dispersion in the losses repre-
sented by σL. The concept of redundancy according to the earthquake engineering
field, as reported by Cimellaro et al. (2010), Bruneau and Reinhorn (2007), is next
considered:
Redundancy is the “quality of having alternative paths in the structure by which
the lateral forces can be transferred, which allows the structure to remain stable
following the failure of any single element” (ASCE and FEMA, 2000)
In order to have a complete overview of the resilience problems also the defini-
tion of redundancy in the structural field is reported:
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Q(t) (%)
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t0E + TREt0E
L
R = (1 - L)
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mL + σL
Figure 16: Schematic representation of robustness concept (Cimellaro et al., 2010)
Structural redundancy refers to the multiple availability of load-carrying compo-
nents or multiple load paths which can bear additional loads in the event of failure.
If one or more components fail, the remaining structure is able to redistribute the
loads and thus prevent a failure of the entire system. Redundancy depends on the
geometry of the structure and the properties of the individual load-carrying ele-
ments (Frangopol and Curley, 1987).
Redundancy is a very important attribute of resilience, since it represents the
capability to use alternative resource when the main ones are insufficient or miss-
ing. If the redundancy is not part of our structure or system ,changes can be done,
such as duplicating components in order to provide alternatives in case of failure.
The fourth and last component introduced by MCEER is the resourcefulness.
Resourcefulness is “the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, and
mobilize resource when condition exist that threaten to disrupt some element, struc-
ture, system or other unit of analysis (Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2007).
Resourcefulness and Redundancy are strongly interconnected, for example re-
sourcefulness can create redundancies that did not exist before. Moreover, re-
sourcefulness and redundancy can affect the shape and the rapidity of the recovery
function and the recovery time. As illustrated in Figure 17, where a third axis is
added to consider resourcefulness, adding resources can reduce time recovery be-
yond what is expected by the benchmark normal condition. In theory, if infinite
resources were available, time recovery would asymptotically approach zero. Prac-
tically, even in the presence of enormous financial and labor capabilities a practical
minimum time recovery exists. An example is the replacement of the Santa Monica
freeway bridges following the 1994 Northridge earthquake. The replacement of this
critical structure was accomplished 2.5 months faster than in the original planning,
at a reported bonus cost of over 14 million of dollars paid to the contractor for early
completion. Likewise in less advanced societies where resources are scarce, time
23
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Figure 17: The influence of resourcefulness on resilience (Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2007)
recovery could approach infinity. However, also in resourceful societies the time
recovery could be significantly longer than necessary due to inadequate planning,
organizational failures or ineffective policies. Resourcefulness and robustness are
also linked, it can be argued that investing in limiting initial losses (improving the
robustness) might, in some cases, be the preferred approach to enhance resilience
as it automatically translates into a consequent reduction in time recovery; the
retrofitting investment is an investment that pays benefits both axes.
Looking at Equations 1 and 2 it is clear that the loss function (L), the recovery
function (fRec) and the time recovery (TRe) play an important role in engineer-
ing evaluation of resilience; in the next subsection these three components will be
discussed in more depth.
4.1 Loss Function
Losses in an exceptional event like terroristic attack, blast or other man-made dis-
aster are very uncertain and are different for every scenario considered. However,
some common classification can be made and various types of losses defined. The
function of losses L(I, TRE) can be considered as additive function composed of
two main contribution: direct losses (LD) and indirect losses (LI).
L(I, TRE) = LD + αI · LI (7)
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Direct losses (LD) occur “instantaneously” during the event, while the indirect ones
have also temporary dependence. In Equation 7 the indirect losses are multiplied
by a weight factor (αI) dependent on the structure importance and influence of
the structure on other systems. Direct and indirect losses can be divided into
two subgroups: Economic losses (LDE;LIE) and Casualties losses (LDC ;LIC).
Direct economic losses are mainly physical structural and non-structural losses
that can be expressed as the ratio between building repair and replacement costs
as indicated in Equation 8
LDE, k(I) =
n∑
j=1
[
Cs,j
Is
ti∏
i=1
(1 + δi)
(1 + ri)
]
· Pj
{
n⋃
i=1
(Ri ≥ rlim i) | I
}
(8)
where PJ is the conditional probability of exceeding a performance limit state j
when an extreme event of intensity I occurs, this probability is also known as
fragility function and will be discussed in detail in the Section 5; Cs,j are the
building repair costs associated with a j damage state; IS are the replacement
building costs; ri is the annual discount rate applied for the time range in years ti
between the initial investment and the extreme event; δi is the annual depreciation
rate. Direct economic losses (LDE i) are obtained for every structural and non
structural k element, then the “global” direct economic losses are computed using
the following weight average expression:
LDE(I) =
(
∑n
k=1 wk · LDE,k(I))
N
(9)
In Equation 9 wk is a weight factor associated to each structural and non-structural
component in the building while N is the total number of structural and non-
structural component such as ceilings, elevators, mechanical and electrical equip-
ment, piping, partitions, glass etc.
Direct casualties losses LDC are measured as the ratio of instantaneous number
of injured or dead Nin and the total number of occupants Ntot:
LDC =
Nin
Ntot
(10)
The number of injured people Nin depends on multiple factors such as the type of
structure and building, the time of the day of the extreme event occurrence etc.,
and this makes quite difficult to estimate in a proper way the direct casualties
losses.
The indirect economic losses LIE(I, TRE) are time dependent and they are the
most difficult to quantify because of the different forms they can have: business
interruptions, relocation expenses, rental income losses, etc. Losses of revenue can
be caused by damage on structure or non-structural elements and they are most
important for manufacturing, retail facilities and to lifelines. Damage to the for-
mer could lead to reduction in delivered resources like electricity, water natural gas
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or transportation and can be more significant than direct losses. Indirect economic
losses due to business interruption should be modeled considering the structural
and non-structural losses LDE and the time recovery (TRE) needed to repair the
structure. Obviously TRE is strictly correlated with the direct economic losses
because it increases with the extent of the structural damage (Miles and Chang,
2006, 2003).
The indirect casualties losses (LIC) describe the number of injuries or deaths
due to functionality disruption and could be evaluated as the ratio between the
number of injured people Nin and the total number of people served by the building
Ntot:
LIC =
Nin
Ntot
(11)
These types of losses could be quite important for structures like hospital where
the loss of functionality can generate injuries and deaths for a long period after
the occurred extreme event.
Finally LD and LI can be calculated, as suggested by Cimellaro et al. (2010), as
follows:
LD = L
αDE
DE · (1 + αDC LDC)
LI = L
αIE
IE · (1 + αIC LIC)
(12)
where αDE and αIE are weighting factors related to construction losses in economic
term and business interruption, respectively, while αDC and αIC are the weighting
factors related to nature of occupancy. It should be noted that casualties losses
were introduced as penalty function in Equations 12.
4.2 Recovery Function and Time
Recovery time (TRE) and recovery function (fRec) are essential for evaluating re-
silience, hence they should be evaluated accurately. These crucial points unfortu-
nately were treated in a approximate way such as the linear trend covered in one
year proposed in HAZUS (Whitman et al., 1997). Moreover, the critical structure
considered could not return to the pre-disaster functionality state, but it may ex-
ceed the previous performance if during the recovery process pre-existing problem
are fixed (Figure 18 - curve C) or it can be damaged permanently (Figure 18 -
curve A). An example of permanent functionality loss is represented by the Port of
Kobe. In 1994, prior to the earthquake (one of the most significant earthquake in
the word: it destroyed 150,000 buildings, 1 km of the Hanshin Expressway, 120 of
the 150 quays in the port of Kobe, and fires which raged over large portions of the
city (City of Kobe, 2012)), the port was the world’s sixth largest container port in
terms of cargo throughput; in 1997 after the repairs had been completed, the port
was ranked seventeenth (Chang and Nojima, 2001). Recovery process is complex
and it is influenced by many variables, time dimensions and spatial dimension.
Moreover, viewing disaster resilience and recovery process as a deliberate process
26
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Figure 18: The influence of resourcefulness on resilience (Cimellaro et al., 2010)
that comprises a series of event, actions or changes to enhance the capacity of
affected structure or system, but also community, when faced to singular, multiple
or unique shocks and stresses,places emphasis on the human role. In summary,
the recovery phase and time show disparities among different geographic areas in
the same community or state, showing different rates and quality of recovery.This
observation highlights how complex is to model recovery of single critical facility or
critical systems. Different type of recovery function can be selected depending on
the system and society preparedness response, for example three possible recovery
functions are: linear, exponential (Kafali and Grigoriu, 2005) and trigonometric
(Chang and Shinozuka, 2004).
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Figure 19: Linear Recovery function: a) linear; b) exponential; c) trigonometric (Cimel-
laro et al., 2010)
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frec = a
(
t− t0E
TRE
)
+ b linear (13)
frec = a exp
(
−b t− t0E
TRE
)
exponential (14)
frec =
a
2
{
1 + cos
[
pib (t− t0E)
TRE
]}
trigonometric (15)
The simplest form is the linear one that is generally used when there is not infor-
mation regarding preparedness and resources available (Figure 19(a)). The expo-
nential recovery function could be used when the responce is driven by an initial
inflow of resource, but the rapidity decreas as the process reachs the end(Figure
19(b)). The last one is the trigonomatric that is used when the recovery responce
is driven by lack or limited resources (Figure 19(c)).
5 Structural fragility curves and resilience
The prediction of structural damage is critical for the evaluation of economic losses
and should be carefully estimated specially for critical structures. A possible and
useful representation to describe structural damage distribution is given by fragility
curves. Fragility curves provide graphic information on the distribution of damage
by representing the cumulative distribution of damage, which specifies the con-
tinuous probability that an indicated damage level has been reached or exceeded.
Fragility curves were introduced in the framework of earthquake engineering and
they can be empirical or analytical, based on the source of the and type of analysis.
Empirical fragility curves are based on test or field data interpretation and
engineering judgment. They are usually based on damage data reported from past
events, for example Shinozuka et al. (2000b) present empirical fragility curves from
bridge damage observed in the 1995 Kobe earthquake.
Analytical fragility curves are developed from structural response data obtained
through analysis of structures using simulated input data for exceptional event con-
sidered, for example ground motion for earthquake problems as Shinozuka et al.
(2000a) did, exploiting non linear analysis.
Theoretically, fragility curves represent the probability that the response R
of a structure exceeds a given threshold rlim given a certain excitation level. It
can be represented as proposed in Equation 16, as follow (Barron-Corvera, 2000;
Reinhorn et al., 2001):
Fragility = FY = P {R ≥ rlim | I} (16)
where R is the response parameter (deformation, displacement, force, velocity,
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Figure 20: S.O.M.B.R.E.R.O representation of a simple bell curve
acceleration, etc.); rlim is the response threshold parameter that is linked with the
damage and I is the intensity of the event. This definition can be extended to
the N -dimensional space when the number of parameters to be checked is N , by
applying the following equation (Cimellaro et al., 2006):
Fragility = FY = P {R1 ≥ rlim 1 ∪ R2 ≥ rlim 2 . . . ∪ RN ≥ rlim N | I}
= P
{
n⋃
i=1
Ri ≥ rlim, i | I
} (17)
where Ri is the response parameter related to a certain quantity (force, displace-
ment, acceleration, etc.) and rlim, i is the corresponding threshold parameter cor-
related to damage. For example in a two dimensional case considering ∆ and Ω
as control parameters the fragility can be written as follow:
Fragility = FY = P {∆ ≥ Dlim ∪ Ω ≥ Olim | I} (18)
In this case the probability distribution can be represented like a surface (i.e, 3-D
“bell curve” see Figure 20) as proposed by Bruneau and Reinhorn (2007) to achieve
quantification of engineering seismic resilience through the concept of Sliding an
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Overlaid Multidimensional Bell-curve of Response for Engineering Resilience Oper-
ationalization (S.O.M.B.R.E.R.O) using an Orthogonal Limit-space Environment
(OLE). The surface can be expressed by iso-probability contours in the OLE space
as shown in Figure 21. SOMBRERO representation coupled with limit states
OLE space
Figure 21: Iso-probability contours in OLE space
thresholds can give useful information regarding damage state and the probability
that the response exceeds a specific limit. In Figure 22 the bell surface and a plane
representing a mono-parametric limit state is reported, the limit state governed
by one parameter is represented by a line into the OLE plane. The probability to
exceed a specific limit state can be directly calculated from the volume under the
surface distribution exceeding the threshold. In figure 22 a mono-parametric limit
has been introduced for simplicity, however the response of the structure can be
analyzed considering one or more mono-parametric limit states and/or generalized
multidimensional performance limit states, as illustrated in Figure 23. The gray
area in Figure 23 represents the one where limit states have been exceeded and it
is used to compute the corresponding probability.
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Isoprobability contours
OLE space
Limit state
Figure 22: Bell surface, iso-probability contours and limit state in OLE space
Generalized formulation for multidimensional performance limit states have
been proposed by Cimellaro et al. (2006) and it can be expressed as follows:
L (R1, . . . Rn) =
(
R1
rlim 1
)N1
+
(
R2
rlim 2
)N2
+ . . . +
(
Rn
rlim n
)Nn
− 1 = 0 (19)
Equation 19 can be written in a more compact form:
L (R1, . . . Rn) =
n∑
i=1
(
Ri
rlim i
)Ni
− 1 (20)
where Ri is the response parameter (displacement, energy, force, acceleration,
etc.); ri is the response threshold parameter which correlated with the structural
or non-structural damage and Ni is the interaction factor determining the shape
of n-dimensional surface. The response threshold parameters used to define the
limit states, reported for simplicity over only two response parameters in Figure
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Figure 23: Multidimensional Limit states and generalized form in the OLE space
23, are deterministic, however they could be also considered as random variables.
The probability of exceedance for a two dimensional limit state can be expressed
as follow (Cimellaro et al., 2006; Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2007):
FY = PLS = lim
NTE→∞

NR
[(
R1
rlim 1
)N1
+
(
R2
rlim 2
)N2
≥ 1
]
NTE
 (21)
where NR is the number of responses that exceeds the performance limit state
while NTE is the total number of responses. In order to reduce the probability
of exceedance it is possible to design ad hoc retrofitting strategies that lead to a
change in the probable structural response, which is equivalent to sliding the mul-
tidimensional bell curve within the OLE space, as schematically shown in Figure
24. On the other hand, severe events like impact or blast or effects acting during a
long period like alkali-silica reaction or steel rebar corrosion can move the bell sur-
face into the gray area in the OLE space leading to an increase of the probability
of exceedance.
By applying the concepts introduced above it is possible to build proper fragility
curves for the structure or infrastructure considered. Focusing the attention to the
fragility curves, the influence of exceptional loading events, resourcefulness and
retrofitting can be better understood considering Figures 25, 26, 27 and 28. In
Figure 25(a) the functionality over time is reported, the structure results undam-
aged up to t0 when an event occurs; till that time the fragility curve is represented
by the blue line in Figure 25(b). Due to the exceptional event of intensity I1 the
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Figure 24: Effects of retrofitting on bell curve in the OLE space
structure has been damaged and the fragility curve moves up (red line in Figure
25(b)), hence if an event with intensity I1 occurs, the probability of exceeding the
limit state considered is higher than the one observed for the undamaged struc-
ture. Focusing attention on the recovery phase and considering different instants
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Figure 25: Effects of an event with intensity I1 on the fragility curve: a) functionality;
b) fragility curves
(see Figure 26(a)) between t0 and t1 (time marking the end of recovery), Figure
26(b) illustrates how structural repairs progressively shift the fragility curve back
to the original condition that existed before the instant t0, and finally attained
at t1. This requires a financial investment. Moreover, as Figures 27 shows, it is
possible to increase the functionality to above the pre-event condition, this leading
to enhance resilience by reducing the probability of losses in a future exceptional
33
5 STRUCTURAL FRAGILITY CURVES AND RESILIENCE
event.
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Figure 26: Effects of resourcefulness and recovery phase on the fragility curve: a)
functionality; b) fragility curves
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Figure 27: Effects of structural performance enhancement after recovery phase on the
fragility curve: a) functionality; b) fragility curves
The benefit of retrofitting prior to an exceptional event can be assessed and
quantified using the fragility curves and resilience concepts presented in Figures
25. As proposed by Bruneau and Reinhorn (2007), it is assumed that the relativity
of the fragility curves in Figure 25(b) for a given structure remain the same, and
the retrofit prior to an event is equivalent to sliding fragility curves along the
horizontal axis such that a greater, in terms of intensity, event is required after
retrofit to produce the same probable loss of structural functionality (Figure 28(b)).
Once the structure has been retrofitted, the functionality Q(t) has been increased
(Figure 28(a)). Furthermore, when an exceptional event with the same intensity
occurs the probable loss of structural functionality due to damage should be also
reduced as shown by the corresponding drop between time t−0 and t
+
0 in Figure
28(a). The benefit due to retrofitting strategies can be underlined also considering
the recovery time which can be drastically reduced leading to an increase of the
structural resilience properties.
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Figure 28: Effects of retrofitting on the fragility curve and structural functionality: a)
functionality; b) fragility curves
6 Concluding remarks
It is evident that the resilience concepts and framework summarized above are not
in contrast with the Eurocode philosophy or any other performance-based design
approach commonly used in North America. The resilience approach considered
introduces the losses and loss recovery in time by applying loss functions in engi-
neering and economical terms and functionality functions before, during and after
an extreme event.
The resilience formulation presented introduces the effects of response, recovery
and retrofit in the aftermath of a exceptional event as parameters of functionality
losses, which influence physical and socioeconomic systems. The method summa-
rized in the previous sections is quite capable to quantify resilience and it can
be considered as a consistent and comprehensive approach useful to understand
damage, response and recovery. In fact, resilience functions reported manage to
explain quantitatively and qualitatively the time variation of damage as well as
its link to response and recovery. Finally, the resilience concepts reported can be
useful to help the decision makers in planning processes to efficiently improve and
guide in response and recovery operations.
Certainly, there are still several important steps to be done for an effective
adoption of resilience approaches in design. Define a uniform glossary, improve
the link with developed risk assessment and mapping approaches and produce
a harmonized guidelines for resilience management with a basic set of resilience
management activities to assist authorities, lifeline operators and public are some
of the key aspects to be developed. They are essential elements, necessary to
adopt these ideas and thus needed to enhance the resilience of European critical
infrastructures.
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